Objectives Frank, clear communication with
OBJECTIVE A significant proportion of family members will serve as surrogate decision makers for an incapacitated loved one at the end of life, often without the assistance of advance directives. 1 2 There are many aspects of the decision-making process that are burdensome for surrogates including uncertainty about prognoses, acknowledgment of the potential loss of the patient and a responsibility to make the right decision. 3 The emotional aspects of the situation may impair surrogates' abilities to process information from healthcare providers as well as their reasoning ability. 4 Communicating effectively with family members of terminally ill or incapacitated patients is challenging but important to their well-being and ability to make sound decisions. Providing clear, frank information at the end of life is related to satisfaction with medical care. 5 However, even direct, numerical prognostic statements (eg, a 95% chance of dying) are interpreted in a positively biased manner by surrogate decision makers, particularly when prognoses are poor. 6 Furthermore, physicians report preferring subjective nonnumerical communication about risk. 7 This propensity raises the question of the extent to which commonly used, less precise non-numerical prognostic statements (eg, probably will not survive) may be even more likely to be interpreted in this way. Relatedly, the language and terms used in clinical encounters have important implications. 8 Since the framing of information in terms of positive and negative outcomes has been shown to influence the impact of messages, 9 it is also of interest whether conveying prognoses using words that are more threatening (ie, dying vs surviving) also may contribute to positive bias. Thus, this study examined the numerical interpretation of non-numerical prognostic statements conveying prognoses varying from good to poor outcomes framed in terms of dying versus surviving.
METHODS
Participants (N=200 undergraduates, 139 female) were recruited through the Psychology Department participant pool. They had no prior experience as surrogate decision makers for a family member or a friend, to avoid any bias from past experience, and did not currently have a critically ill family member or friend, to avoid unnecessarily upsetting individuals in such situations. They were asked to imagine that they were speaking to a physician about a patient or a parent being treated in an intensive care unit and asked, for example: 'If the doctor says to you, "I'm concerned that [they] will not survive," what does that mean to you?' Participants were presented with 14 such non-numerical prognostic statements conveying varying levels of risk framed in terms of dying or surviving (see table 1). They then indicated what they believed the likelihood of survival to be by making a mark on a 10 cm line depicting a scale from 0% to a 100%.
Likelihood of survival was determined by measuring in millimetres from the leftmost reference point of 0% likelihood to the place where respondents marked the line. Deviation from the reference point of 100% survival was measured in millimetres to the mark for the positive prognostic statements (ie, those that indicated that survival was likely) and from the reference point of 0% survival for negative prognostic statements (ie, those that indicated that survival was unlikely). Degree of positive bias was determined by assessing the extent to which similarly worded prognostic statements differing only in whether their outcome was positive or negative (eg, It is very likely that they will survive vs It is very unlikely that they will survive) deviated from their reference point of 100% survival or 0% survival, respectively.
Mean likelihood of survival was calculated for each statement to determine how non-numerical statements using such non-numerical terms as 'definitely, probably, possibly' and phrases such as 'concerned that' and 'optimistic that' were interpreted numerically. Within-participants t-tests were used to examine positive bias by testing whether the deviation of estimates from their reference point for similarly worded prognostic statements was higher for those that conveyed negative ( poor likelihood of survival) versus positive (good likelihood of survival) outcomes. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to determine whether there was an interaction of the effect of prognostic outcome (ie, positive, or a good likelihood of survival, vs negative, or a poor likelihood of survival) and the framing of prognostic statements (conveyed in terms of dying vs surviving) such that the most positive bias would be observed in response to statements that convey a negative outcome and were phrased in a more threatening manner, that is, in terms of dying. Table 1 shows the average per cent likelihood of survival estimated in response to the non-numerical prognostic statements as well as the average deviation from their reference point, listed in order from the highest to the lowest likelihood of survival.
RESULTS
The highest estimate of likelihood of survival was in response to 'they will definitely survive' (92.77%) and the lowest was in response to 'they will definitely not survive' (18.82%). When these same frame/different outcome statements were compared, '[They] will definitely not survive' was interpreted significantly more optimistically, in that it was significantly further from its reference point of 0% survival, than '[They] will definitely survive' was from its reference point of 100% survival, t(199)=6.59, p<0.001. Similarly, the statement, 'I would say it's very unlikely that [they] will survive'. There was no main effect of framing F(1, 199)=0.12, p=.731 and no interaction of framing and prognostic outcome F(1, 199)=0.66, p<0.001. However, there was a main effect of outcome, again suggesting that statements that conveyed a poorer prognosis were more likely to be interpreted in a positively biased manner F(1, 199) =61.01, p<0.001.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we asked respondents to estimate the likelihood of survival to non-numerical prognostic statements in order to provide a window on how recipients might understand an array of potentially vague descriptors of prognostic outcomes such as 'possibly' and 'probably' as well as more conclusive terms such as 'definitely'. For instance, a statement such as 'It is possible that [they] will not survive' is interpreted to indicate approximately a 50/50 chance of survival. Interestingly, adding a more emotionally laden phrase 'I am concerned that [they] will not survive' resulted in a much lower expectation (35.64%) regarding the likelihood of survival. It is also interesting to note that even the most extremely positive and negative prognostic statements involving the phrases 'will definitely survive' and 'will definitely not survive' were not interpreted to indicate 100% likelihood of surviving or dying. This suggests that recipients' interpretations, even of the most rosy or dire predictions, are tempered to some degree. We found further that similarly worded statements portraying poorer outcomes are more likely to be interpreted in positively biased ways relative to less poor outcomes. This adds to previous findings 6 that numerical prognostic statements are subject to positive bias. This also demonstrates that these effects can occur even in individuals not currently under the duress of serving as a surrogate decision maker, and may represent a defensive phenomenon in response to negative information that operates more generally, and perhaps in the context of other types of medical consultations. Since numerical statements are also subject to bias, we do not suggest that subjective non-numerical prognostic descriptions be avoided, as recipients of risk information also encode verbatim representations of information as well as less formal gist representations. 10 Finally, we did not find evidence that this optimistic bias was affected by the wording of the prognostic statements in terms of dying versus surviving. Thus, this aspect of the language used in conveying prognoses may not be relevant to optimistically biased interpretation of information.
CONCLUSION
In addition to using suggested strategies such as inquiring about how much individuals wish to know about prognoses, 11 practitioners should be aware of the ways in which commonly used non-numeric language may be understood in numeric terms during prognostic discussions, and check recipients' understanding during consultations for accuracy 12 and potential positive bias.
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